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For a market with a finite number of agents, pairwise matching and bargaining, it is shown 
that, even when the market is frictionless, the equilibrium is not necessarily competitive.  It depends 
on the amount of information agents use.  If their behaviour is conditioned  only on the sets of 
agents present and the time, the competitive solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. 
If  agents  have  full  information  and  condition  their behaviour  on  some  of  it,  there are also 
noncompetitive equilibria in which behaviour depends on specific information such as the identity 
of the trading partner and past events. 
1.  INTRODUCTION  AND  DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  MODEL 
The competitive  outcome  is often motivated by a naive scenario in which price-taking 
agents respond to prices announced by an impartial auctioneer.  However, the predictions 
of the competitive outcome are viewed as relevant for a much wider range of scenarios. 
In the present paper we consider  a market for an indivisible good  in which the trade 
process is decentralized, in the sense that prices are determined in direct contacts between 
pairs of agents.  In such markets we still expect to get the competitive outcome, if certain 
conditions  are satisfied.  It is common to include  in such conditions  the existence of a 
"large" number of agents and certain informational assumptions.  However, notice that 
we also expect the competitive outcome to emerge in environments which are not classified 
as competitive in the above sense.  Thus, for example, we expect the competitive outcome 
even  in  the  case  of  one  seller  of  an  indivisible  unit  who  faces  two  buyers who  bid 
simultaneously for the unit. 
In this paper we investigate conditions under which the competitive outcome is the 
unique equilibrium in models  of a market for an indivisible good  in which the trade is 
decentralized.  The approach is to model in detail some particular (albeit natural) trading 
processes as games in extensive form, to examine the appropriate noncooperative equili- 
brium outcomes  and to  sort out the circumstances under which they approximate the 
competitive  outcome.  This  is  then  the  same  approach  as  adopted,  for  example,  by 
Rubinstein-Wolinsky  (1985),  Binmore-Herrero (1988), and Gale (1987). 
The basic model is perhaps the simplest framework that combines pairwise meetings 
and some form of strategic bargaining. It is related to the models of Binmore and Herrero 
(1988) and Gale (1987).  The agents in the model are S identical sellers and B identical 
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buyers, and it is assumed throughout that S < B.  Each seller has one unit of the good 
for sale and each buyer wishes to buy exactly one unit.  The market operates over time. 
The time dimension is discrete and the periods will be labelled with t = 0, 1, 2, .... 
In each period the remaining sellers and buyers are matched pairwise in a manner 
that no agent meets more than one agent of the opposite type.  The matching process is 
random.  In  each  period  at least  one  match takes place  and  all possible  seller-buyer 
matches are equally probable.  It should be mentioned  that these  are not the minimal 
assumptions necessary for the conclusions  of the paper to hold.  We adopt them for the 
sake of simplicity. 
After a buyer and a seller have been matched, they go through a short bargaining 
process over the terms of a possible trade between them.  First, one of the matched agents 
is selected randomly (with probability 1/2)  to propose a price between 0 and 1, and then 
the other agent responds by accepting the proposed price or rejecting it.  If the proposal 
is accepted the parties will implement it and depart from the market. Rejection dissolves 
the match and the agents proceed to the next matching stage. 
When a transaction is concluded with price p at time t the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility to the involved seller is p and to the buyer it is (1 -p).  A utility of 0 is assigned 
to an agent who never leaves the, market.  Notice  that there is no impatience associated 
with  delays  in trade: an  agent derives the  same benefit from a transaction at price p 
independently  of its timing. 
Regarding the agents' information,  we shall distinguish among different regimes which 
will be spelled  out later.  These informational assumptions will determine the notion of 
a history. 
A strategy for an agent specifies an action after each possible history that ends at a 
decision  point.  After histories that end with the  agent being  selected  to  propose,  the 
strategy specifies the price to be proposed.  After histories that end with the agent facing 
a proposed price, the strategy specifies the agent's response (acceptance or rejection) to 
every possible  offer. 
The above together with specification of the agents' information constitute a complete 
description of a game.  The solution concepts that will be applied are subgame perfect or 
sequential equilibrium,  depending on whether the considered version is a game of perfect 
or imperfect information. 
In the context  of  this model  the  competitive solution is such that all the available 
units  are  sold  to  buyers  for  the  price  1.  This  solution  is  depicted  by  the  familiar 
demand-supply diagram of Figure 1. 
One may suppose that the frictionless trading process described in this model, where 
it is  costless  for agents to  meet and exchange  offers, already constitutes  a sufficiently 
competitive  environment which  should  result in the competitive  solution.  The idea  is 
that, since  B > S, at any price less than 1 there would be buyers who would agree to a 
slight increase in price rather than be left without the good,  and since  sellers are not 
impatient they will wait until the price is bid in this manner up to 1. This view is seemingly 
supported by the above cited work of Binmore-Herrero and Gale. 
The message of the present paper is that such conditions of frictionless trading are 
not in themselves  sufficient for the competitive  solution  to be the unique equilibrium. 
When there is perfect information,  and in the absence  of  additional  assumptions, the 
model has noncompetitive  sequential equilibria which are interpretable, i.e. they can be 
described verbally without using technical terms specific to the model.  In order to obtain 
the competitive solution  as the unique equilibrium, one needs extra assumptions which 
limit the information that agents utilize for their market behaviour. RUBINSTEIN  & WOLINSKY  STRATEGIC  TRADING  EQUILIBRIA  65 
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The family of  noncompetitive  equilibria that we  construct for the case of  perfect 
information to demonstrate the points mentioned above has the following interpretation. 
There is some predetermined price p* and there is an implicit understanding that certain 
S buyers have the privilege of buying the units at that price.  The equilibrium strategies 
are designed  so as to prevent the sellers and nonprivileged buyers from circumventing 
this implicit understanding.  Thus, even though the process permits active participation 
by all parties, at the equilibrium, the nonprivileged give way to the privileged. The source 
of the privileges and the manner in which the price p* is determined are left unmodelled. 
Although one  may think of  a variety of social  arrangements which have the flavour of 
instituting a noncompetitive  "fair price" and allocating privileges by some  nonmarket 
mechanism,  it is  not  our purpose  in  this  paper to  study such  arrangements.  On the 
contrary, our  purpose  is  to  understand the  conditions  which  isolate  the  competitive 
outcome as the solution. 
The strategies that support the above described noncompetitive  equilibria rely on 
some detailed information (e.g. a seller has to act differently depending on the identity 
of the buyer that he faces-whether  or not this buyer is privileged).  When attention is 
restricted to environments in which agents condition their behaviour only on sufficiently 
limited information, either because their observations are limited or because they disregard 
some  information  as irrelevant, these  equilibria are ruled out.  Specifically, when  the 
relevant information on which agents condition their behaviour is only the time and the 
sets of sellers and buyers present in the market, then the competitive solution is the unique 
sequential equilibrium outcome. 
One question suggested by these observations concerns the extent to which agents' 
information has to be limited in order to  have the competitive  solution  as the unique 
equilibrium.  We  examine  an  intermediate case  which  lies  between  the  two  extremes 
described above and in which agents do not observe the offers exchanged between others. 
They observe only their own personal histories and the sets of the remaining agents.  It 
is shown that, with this restriction, there are still sequential equilibria which give rise to 
noncompetitive  outcomes of the type described above. 
The paper concludes  with a discussion  of the role of two modelling  assumptions: 
the  absence  of  costs  of  time,  and the  random matching assumption.  This discussion 
clarifies the relations between the present work and the related work by Binmore-Herrero 
and Gale.  In particular, it enables us to point out how seemingly unimportant modelling 
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the  conclusions  that these  works derived from quite  similar models  sometimes  differ 
markedly from our conclusions. 
Finally, let us call attention to what we view as an interesting modelling point.  In 
the description of the equilibrium strategies we use the language of finite automata.  An 
agent's strategy is described by a set of states and rules of transition between them, where 
each state specifies the agent's behaviour (offers and acceptance policy) in it. This method 
not only provides an unambiguous description of the strategies, but also gives rise to a 
natural interpretation of the strategies in terms of  "states of mind" of the agents.  For 
the use of this tool in the context of repeated games see, for example, Rubinstein (1986). 
2.  FRICTIONLESS  MARKET  WITH  FULL  INFORMATION 
In the model of the present section agents have a substantial amount of information in 
the sense that at the beginning of date t agents know everything that has happened in 
the market up to the end of date t-  1.  For concreteness assume that in a given period 
an  agent  receives  the  following  pieces  of  information  in  the  following  order: (i)  the 
identity of his match and the selection of the proposer; (ii) the proposal; (iii) the response; 
(iv) the information regarding this period's events throughout the market. The type of 
situation that seems to satisfy either these or qualitatively similar assumptions is an open 
trading situation which resembles an oral auction in that all traders are gathered together 
and offers are exchanged publicly. 
Notice that this is a game of imperfect information because in a given period agents 
are not  informed  about  events  that take  place  simultaneously  in  other matches.  All 
subgames of this game start  just before the matching stage and after all agents are informed 
about past events.  The concept  of subgame perfect equilibrium is sufficient to ensure 
the optimality of the proposer's move in each of the matches, but it does not ensure the 
optimality of  an agent's response to an out of  equilibrium offer and hence we employ 
the  concept  of  sequential  equilibrium.  The  latter concept  requires optimality  of  the 
responses, given the agent's beliefs about events that occur in the simultaneous matches. 
Recall that these beliefs are not completely arbitrary  even after unexpected offers. They 
have to satisfy a consistency requirement (see  Kreps and Wilson (1982)) which implies 
here that, after unexpected offers, the beliefs agree with the equilibrium plans of the other 
agents. 
The intuitive arguments which suggest the competitive solution of price equal to  1 
do not refer to any restrictions on the information of agents.  Thus, it might appear that 
there is no reason to expect that the obvious competitive pressures in the model would 
be inhibited by the fact that agents can condition their behaviour on extensive information. 
However, the following proposition shows that when there is full information, there exist 
sequential equilibria which are not competitive. 
Proposition 1.  For any price p*,  O-p*'  1, and any assignment b(k)  which  fits  a 
distinct buyer i = b(k)  to each seller k, there is a sequential equilibrium  in which seller k's 
unit is sold to i at price p*. 
The  equilibrium  is  constructed  around  the  idea  that  the  trading  process  is  not 
impersonal: there is one  buyer i = b(k)  who  for some  reason has the privilege to buy 
seller k's good  and this is known to everybody.  This privilege means that seller k will 
demand price p* only from i and will agree to this price offer only from i.  Buyers other 
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price up by the following understandings: if the seller demands from some buyer a price 
p, p* <p  <  1, then upon refusal this buyer acquires the privilege; if a buyer other than i 
bids above p*, the understanding is that buyer i gets the opportunity to match this offer. 
Proof:  Each equilibrium strategy will be described as a collection of states and rules 
of  transition  between  them.  A  seller's  strategy is  based  on  the  states  RIGHT (i p) 
=1,...,  B, p _p  p*and  NORIGHT.  The interpretation is that in state RIGHT (  ip)  buyer 
i has the privilege of buying this seller's unit for p, while in state NORIGHT no buyer 
has this privilege.  A buyer's strategy is based on the states RIGHT (k, p), k = 1, ...  S p ? 
p *,  and NORIGHT.  In state RIGHT (k, p) the buyer has the privilege to buy seller k's 
good  at the price p; in state NORIGHT the buyer has no such privilege. 
The equilibrium strategies are described by Table I and the accompanying lists of 
transition rules.  Each row corresponds to a state and describes the agent's behaviour in 
TABLE  I 
Seller k's Strategy 
State  Offer to buyer j  Accept from buyer j 
RIGHT(i,p)  p ifj=i  q_p  if j=i 
l  if j]  i  none if j$  i 
NORIGHT  1  none 
Transition Rules 
Switch from NORIGHT to: 
RIGHT (j, p*)  If you (seller k) have just met buyer j who was in state NORIGHT. 
RIGHT (j, p)  If you  (seller  k) have just received offer q, q > p* from buyer j  who was in state 
RIGHT (1,  p),  for some  1  k. 
Switch from RIGHT (i  p)  to: 
RIGHT (i, q)  If buyer j $ i has just offered you (seller k) price q, q > p or if another seller 1  $ k 
has just offered buyer i price q, p* -  q < p. 
RIGHT (j,p*)  If you (seller k) have just offered p, 1 > p > p*, to buyer j  who was in NORIGHT. 
NORIGHT  If buyer i has just left the market or has just switched to  RIGHT (1,  p)  for some 
1  k and some p. 
Otherwise stay in the same state. 
Buyer i's Strategy 
State  Offer to seller I  Accept from seller I 
RIGHT(k,p)  p if I=k  any q_p  if l=k 
p* if 1  k  any q  p*  if I  l  k 
NORIGHT  p*  any p_p* 
Transition Rules 
Switch from NORIGHT to: 
RIGHT (k, p*)  If you (buyer i) have just met seller k who is in NORIGHT or if seller k has just 
offered youp,  l>p>p*. 
Switch from RIGHT (k, p) to: 
RIGHT (k, q)  If buyer j $ i has just offered seller k price q, q > p, or if seller 1  k has just offered 
you (buyer i) price q, p* < q <p. 
RIGHT (,  p)  If you (buyer i) have just offered q, p* < q <p,  to seller I who was in NORIGHT. 
NORIGHT  If seller k has left the market or has just switched to RIGHT (j,-)  for some j $  i. 
Otherwise stay in the same state. 68  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
this state in the events that he is selected to propose or to respond. The transition between 
states takes place immediately after the relevant information has reached the agent.  For 
example,  if  a  seller's  offer is  supposed  to  change  the  buyer's state, then  the buyer's 
response will already be based on the new state. 
Now  consider an initial assignment of states such that if i = b(k),  then seller k is in 
RIGHT (i, p*)  and buyer i is in state RIGHT (k, p*) and if j  is such that j #  b(l)  for all 
sellers  1, then  buyer j  is  in  state  NORIGHT.  Observe that this  assignment of  states 
together with the above strategies and with beliefs, according to which each agent sticks 
to the presumption that in the other contemporary matches agents follow their equilibrium 
strategies, constitute a sequential equilibrium in which buyer i gets seller k's good  for 
the price p*.  To verify this notice that the deviations that might threaten the equilibrium 
are that, in a meeting between seller k who is in RIGHT (i, p*) and some j $ i who is in 
NORIGHT, one of the parties would offer p, 1 > p >  p*.  However, seller k does not profit 
from offering such p since j  will refuse and this would only result in switching the states 
of  seller  k, buyer j,  and  buyer  i  to  RIGHT (j, p*),  RIGHT (k, p*),  and  NORIGHT, 
respectively.  Buyer j  will not profit from offering p, 1 > p >  p* to seller k since this will 
only result in switching the states of seller k and buyer i to RIGHT (i, p) and RIGHT (k, p), 
respectively.  11 
The equilibrium constructed above captures a trading institution whose main feature 
is that some buyers are privileged.  The source of this privilege is not modelled.  It might 
be determined in the model,  e.g. assigned to the buyer who happens to be the first to 
meet a seller, or it might be determined exogeneously by factors which are not modelled. 
The nonprivileged buyers accept this arrangement.  In any event all that such a buyer 
can accomplish by challenging the arrangement and trying to outbid a privileged buyer 
is bidding up the price to be paid by the privileged buyer. 
Notice  that it is not necessary that all units be sold for the same price.  Using very 
similar strategies we can construct equilibria in which the different buyers get their units 
at different prices. 
An important conclusion  from Proposition  1 is that the basic conditions  of excess 
demand and frictionless interaction are not sufficient to point out a unique solution and 
in order to obtain a unique solution we have to fill in more details about the nature of 
the interaction.  The proposition itself describes a particular solution that arises when the 
trading process is guided by a convention that assigns to a particular buyer the privilege 
of purchasing the good at a predetermined price. 
Notice that even if one is inclined to think that the solution.described by Proposition 
1 is uninteresting in itself,  Proposition  1 still has a valid message as a comment on the 
competitive  solution.  It points  out that the competitive  solution  requires some further 
assumptions  which  essentially  guarantee that the information that agents refer to  and 
condition their behaviour upon is sufficiently limited. 
3.  A  SUFFICIENT  CONDITION  FOR  THE  COMPETITIVE SOLUTION 
The strategies that support the noncompetitive  equilibra of the previous section rely on 
the  fact that agents are informed  about events  occurring throughout the market.  The 
following  proposition gives a sufficient condition  under which the competitive outcome 
is indeed the unique sequential equilibrium. This condition restricts attention to environ- 
ments in which agents' information in the beginning of period t includes only the set of 
agents who  are present at time  t and the time itself.  Let Bt and St denote the sets of RUBINSTEIN  & WOLINSKY  STRATEGIC  TRADING  EQUILIBRIA  69 
buyers and sellers, respectively, who are present at time t.  Under these assumptions on 
the information, a strategy is a price offer and acceptance policy as functions of B,, S,, 
and t. 
Proposition 2.  If agents' information  includes only Bt, S,, and t, the unique sequential 
equilibrium  outcome is such that the good is sold for the price 1. 
Proof  Obviously there exists an equilibrium in which sellers always demand 1. The 
proof that it is unique under the restriction is by induction on the number S of sellers 
in the market. Assume that the proposition is true if the number of sellers is smaller than 
S.  Consider a particular equilibrium. Let vi(t) and wk(t) denote the expected utilities of 
buyer i and seller k, respectively, at the beginning of period t, provided that no transaction 
has taken place up to that time.  Observe that vi(t)  and wk(t) are well-defined, since in 
the absence of a transaction the sets of buyers and sellers are unchanged and strategies 
depend only on time. 
Let m denote the infimum over all equilibria of wk(t). Of course, for all t, E  J  vi  (t) _ 
S(1-  m).  Therefore, at any t there exists some i such that vi(t) c  (1 -  m)S/B.  Consider 
a  seller  who  adopts  the  strategy of  demanding  the  price  1-  E-(1  -  m)S/B  and  not 
agreeing to less as long as the original sets of agents are in the market.  Either he will 
meet at some time t a buyer for whom vi(t + 1) _ (1 -  m)S/B  who will then agree to that 
price, or some other seller will transact beforehand.  In the former case the seller's utility 
will be 1-  E -  (1 -  m)S/B,  while in the latter case it will be 1 by the inductive hypothesis. 
Since a seller can always adopt this strategy, we have m > 1 -  E  -  (1 -  m)S/B  and hence 
m-  1 -  EB/(B - S) for any s > 0,  which means that m = 1. 
To complete  the proof  we have to  show  that the inductive hypothesis  is true for 
S=  1.  This is shown by repeating the above argument. As above, let m be the infimum 
of the seller's expected  utility over all equilibria in the case  S = 1.  By always offering 
1  -  -  (1 -  m)/B  the  seller  must  meet  at  some  time  a  buyer who  will  agree.  Hence 
m  1- EB/(B-  1), for any e > 0, which means m = 1.  jj 
The assumption that agents' information includes only the commonly observed time, 
and the sets of buyers and sellers present in the market need not necessarily be interpreted 
as lack of information or weak memory.  Notice  that if agents have full information (as 
in Section 2), then Proposition 2 can be modified to say that the outcome of any sequential 
equilibrium in which the strategies depend only on S,, B,, and t is the competitive outcome 
(the proof is identical).  Thus, the result can be interpreted as referring to a situation in 
which  all agents believe  that any other information is irrelevant for the trading.  This 
seems to be what is often meant by anonymity assumptions.  The conclusion then is that 
if the process  is characterized by a sufficient degree of  anonymity in the above sense, 
then the equilibrium is necessarily competitive. 
4.  FRICTIONLESS  MARKETS  WITH  IMPERFECT  INFORMATION 
The model of the previous section represents one extreme in that agents rely just on small 
amounts of information.  The model of Section 2 represents another extreme: each agent 
knows everything that has happened and the equilibrium strategies prescribe responses 
to offers that were exchanged between other agents.  The latter information regime seems 
appropriate  for  analyzing  environments  which  resemble  an  oral  auction  in  that  the 
exchange of offers is in the open, or environments in which a faithful record of the offers 
is  kept.  However,  for  analyzing  another important class  of  environments, it is  more 70  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
plausible to assume that agents know only their personal histories.  The purpose of this 
section  is  to  inquire whether the  insights of  the  previous  section  are still valid  in  an 
intermediate information regime in which  each agent's information is restricted to  his 
personal history. That is, does this restriction destroy the ability to maintain arrangements 
that keep  the  price below  the  competitive  level?  As  we  shall  see,  the  answer to  this 
question is mixed.  In order to make the point we wish to make, it suffices to consider 
the  case  of  S = 1,  although  one  can  prove  the  appropriate version  of  the  following 
proposition  for any S < B. 
Proposition 3.  Suppose that S = 1, that agents know their  personal histories, and that 
the seller can identify the different buyers. For any price p*  0?  p* '  1, and any buyer i 
there exists a sequential equilibrium  in which i gets the unit for price p*. 
Proof.  The strategies use the states described in Proposition 1. The seller's strategy 
is based  on  the  states  RIGHT (j, p), j = 1,...,  B, p = p*, 1.  The buyers' strategies are 
based on the states NORIGHT  and RIGHT (p), p = p*  1. The behaviour in these states 
is as described in the proof of Proposition  1 and since there is only one seller we write 
RIGHT (p)  rather than RIGHT (1, p)  and ignore the instructions which refer to  other 
sellers. 
Transition rules  for the seller: 
Switch from RIGHT (i  p*) to: 
RIGHT (j, p*)  after offering buyer j $ i price p, 1  > p >  p*. 
RIGHT (j, 1) after receiving from j $ i an offer p, 1 > p _ p*. 
Otherwise stay in the same state. 
Transition rules  for buyer i: 
Switch from NORIGHT to: 
RIGHT (p*)  after receiving an offer p, 1 > p > p*. 
RIGHT (1) after offering the seller price p, 1  >  p >  p*. 
Otherwise stay in the same state. 
The initial assignments of states is such that the seller and some buyer i are in states 
RIGHT (i  p) and RIGHT (p*),  respectively, and all other buyers are in NORIGHT.  As 
the interaction proceeds, agents observe only their personal histories, they may not know 
the state of other agents.  Therefore, they will base their behaviour on beliefs regarding 
the state of others.  It is assumed that the beliefs of buyer i correspond to his state: when 
he is in state RIGHT (p*),  RIGHT (1), or NORIGHT,  he believes accordingly that the 
seller is in RIGHT (i  p*),  RIGHT (i41), or RIGHT (j, p*) for some j $ i. Thus the initial 
buyer's beliefs are consistent with the initial assignment and they are updated whenever 
the buyer switches from one state to another, as described by the above transition rules. 
To verify that the evolution  of a buyer's beliefs  is consistent with his information 
(i.e. satisfies Bayes rule whenever it is applicable), observe from the above transition rules 
that the only instances in which buyer i updates his beliefs  are when he switches from 
NORIGHT to RIGHT (p*)  or to RIGHT (1).  In both cases the change of beliefs follows 
a meeting with the seller and is consistent with the events that happened in this meeting 
in  the  sense  that  the  seller  will  indeed  switch  to  RIGHT (i  p)  or  to  RIGHT (i1), 
respectively.  In all other cases  a buyer does  not update his beliefs.  Now,  the buyer's 
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in  which  he  was  not  matched.  In the  former case  this  is  again  consistent  with  the 
information obtained in the match, for then the buyer knows that the seller-remains in 
the same state as well.  In the latter case observe that, conditional  on the information 
that the seller did not meet buyer i in the last period and has not reached an agreement, 
the seller's state has not changed with probability one. 
Now, it is a matter of a routine inspection to verify that the above described strategies 
together with the beliefs constitute a sequential equilibrium in which the privileged buyer 
i receives the unit for the price p*.  11 
Thus, the restriction on information does not rule out the possibility of sustaining 
the noncompetitive arrangement as an equilibrium. 
Recall that the equilibrium of Proposition  1 was based on the understanding that, 
when a buyer has the privilege to a unit, he is committed to match competing offers. This 
required that agents be informed about offers exchanged between other traders.  Since 
this  information  is  not  available  in the  present  case,  the  equilibrium is  sustained by 
different behaviour: a nonprivileged buyer who tries to bid for a unit does not raise its 
price for the privileged buyer, but instead is expected to purchase the good at the price 
1 that leaves him with no surplus. 
In our opinion, this feature of the equilibrium makes it somewhat non-robust, since 
it depends on the property that the buyers are indifferent between purchasing the good 
at price  1 and not purchasing the good  at all  (this point was suggested to us by J.-P. 
Benassy).  However,  it  is  not  necessary  to  have  this  feature in  order to  support  an 
equilibrium of  this type.  Using  the idea  developed  in  Proposition  6 below,  it can be 
shown that essentially the same outcomes (in RIGHT (i p) buyer i will get the unit with 
a probability arbitrarily close to 1 rather than 1) can be sustained by equilibria in which 
buyers never buy for their reservation prices. 
5.  THE  ROLE  OF  THE  RANDOM  MATCHING  AND  THE 
NO-DISCOUNTING  ASSUMPTIONS 
This section discusses the role and the meaning of two modeling assumptions which were 
employed throughout. These are the random matching assumption that sellers and buyers 
are matched randomly for one  period at a time, and the assumption that there are no 
costs  of  delay.  This  discussion  reveals the  extent to  which the  qualitative results are 
robust.  It also clarifies the relations with the above cited work of Binmore-Herrero and 
Gale. 
Recall that the model does not specify costs of time: agents behave as if they do not 
attribute importance to whether they reach agreement immediately or after a finite number 
of rounds.  Let us introduce the cost of time by assuming a common discount factor S. 
Thus, if the good  is sold to a buyer after t model-periods  at price p, the utilities to the 
seller and the buyer will be 8tp  and 8'(1 -p),  respectively. 
It is important to notice  that, in the presence of  discounting,  some  details of the 
matching technology,  which are of no consequence in the absence of discounting, affect 
the  structure of the transaction costs in a significant way.  Consider,  for example, the 
pattern of behaviour described in Proposition  1 where buyer i = b(k)  has the privilege 
of buying seller k's good.  With the matching technology  considered above, it will take 
a  random number of  periods  before  buyer  i  and  seller  k will  meet.  Therefore, with 
discounting,  this behaviour will be relatively more costly for the seller than settling on 
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technology which allows buyer i and seller k to meet whenever they wish to do so, without 
waiting for the random process to match them, a transaction between k and i is obviously 
not more costly than a transaction between k and a randomly chosen buyer. 
The differences in the transaction costs between the two scenarios are reflected in 
the corresponding sets of equilibria.  This is demonstrated by the following proposition. 
Let x(k)  and y(k)  be defined as the (x, y)  solution to the system, 
y = S(x+y)/2  (1) 
1 -x  = 3(1 -x+  1 -y)/2k.  (2) 
Observe that x(1)  and y(l)  describe the two-person bargaining equilibrium characterized 
in Rubinstein (1982), where the equilibrium strategies are for the seller to always demand 
price x(1)  and for the buyer to offer y(l). 
Proposition 4.  Consider the case of S = 1. 
(i)  Under the random matching procedure of sections 1-4  there is a unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium agreement is reached immediately and  the 
price is x(B)  or y(B)  according to whether the seller or the buyer was selected to 
propose. 
(ii)  Under a voluntary matching procedure where the seller can choose in each period 
with which buyer to talk, there is a range of subgame perfect equilibria. For any 
buyer i and any x,  1  x  _  x(l),  there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium  such 
that the good is sold to buyer i and the price is x or Ax/(2-  -)  according to whether 
the seller or buyer i was selected to propose in the meeting between them. 
Proof.  The proof of part (i) is a nontrivial extension of the proof for the two-person 
case.  Since it is rather lengthy, it is deferred to the Appendix.  To prove part (ii),  let x 
and  y  be  such  that  1'  x  '  x(1)  and  (x, y)  satisfy  equation  (1)  above.  Consider  the 
following  strategies.  The seller always offers x and agrees to accept y or more.  A buyer 
always offers y and agrees to x or less.  In the first period the seller picks buyer i and in 
case of disagreement the seller will choose to continue the bargaining with the same buyer 
only if the buyer did not deviate.  If a buyer offered less than y or rejected an offer of x 
or less than x, then the seller chooses to discontinue the bargaining with him and picks 
a new buyer. 
To verify that these strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium observe that, 
since y  and x  satisfy equation  (1)  and since the  R.H.S. of  (1)  is the seller's expected 
utility of rejecting an offer, it is indeed optimal for the seller to accept any price above 
y and to reject any price below y.  Since 1 _ x _ x(1)  it follows  from (2) that 
0  ?1 -x'-  ?(1  -x+  1 -y)/2.  (3) 
The R.H.S. of (3) captures the buyer's expected utility in the event that he rejects a price 
offer higher than x, since then the buyer will remain matched and the bargaining will 
continue to the next period.  The L.H.S. of (3) captures the fact that the buyer's expected 
utility is zero if he rejects a price offer of x or higher, since then the seller will return to 
the  matching  process.  Therefore,  inequality  (3)  establishes  that  the  buyer's  strategy 
regarding acceptance of offers is optimal: from the R.H.S. of (3) it pays to reject offers 
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Given the acceptance strategies of the buyer and the seller, respectively, it is optimal 
for the seller to propose  price x  and for the buyer to propose price y.  This completes 
the proof that the suggested strategies form a subgame perfect equilibrium.  11 
Notice that part (ii) of the proposition can be trivially extended to the case of S > 1. 
However, we have been unable to extend part (i) to cover this case. 
Part (ii)  of the proposition  is closely  related to the ideas developed  in discussions 
of the "outside option" principle in Shaked and Sutton (1984) and in Binmore (1985). 
In our notation Binmore has shown that (x(1),  y(l))  is the unique equilibrium in a version 
of the model in which the buyers can always respond to a seller's offer with a counter-offer 
(i.e.  a seller can replace  a partner only  after hearing his  counter-offer).  An extensive 
discussion  of the strategic role of outside options,  which is the basic element here, can 
be found in Shaked (1987). 
Observe  from  (1)  and  (2)  that  x(B)=(B-8)(2-8)/[B(2-8)-8]  and  y(B)= 
8(B -  8)/[B(2-8)-  8].  It follows  that for B>  1, lim,l  y(B)  = lim,l  x(B)  =  1.  Thus, 
the random matching technology  of  Sections  1-4 together with discounting  result in a 
unique  equilibrium  and,  when  8  is  close  to  1, the  equilibrium price  is  close  to  the 
competitive  price of  1.  We do not view this observation as contradictory to the earlier 
conclusion that the competitive solution requires some assumption concerning the imper- 
sonality of the trade process.  Recall that the equilibria that support the noncompetitive 
outcome involved special relationships between sellers and buyers, with the interpretation 
that the buyer in such a relationship has the privilege to buy the seller's unit.  When the 
agents discount time and the matching is random, the special relationships of this type 
are costly to maintain, since time is required to pass between meetings.  Proposition 4(i) 
shows  that these  costs,  regardless of  their magnitude,  prevent the  emergence of  such 
special relationships.  However, this is not the only effect of discounting.  The other effect 
is  that,  in  any  match,  the  proposer  has  some  amount  of  monopoly  power  over the 
responder.  The latter effect depends on the magnitude of  8  and this is the reason that 
only when 8 is close to 1 (but less than 1) we get approximately the competitive outcome. 
Indeed,  when  the  structure of  the  transaction  costs  is  modified  by  adopting  the 
matching technology  which  allows  a seller  and  a buyer to  meet voluntarily, then  the 
special relations of Proposition  1 continue to play a role.  As part (ii) of the proposition 
shows,  for any selection  of  a privileged buyer  i  and any price between the two-party 
bargaining equilibrium (approximately I since lims,  x(1) = lims,  y(l)  = 2) and the com- 
petitive solution,  there exists an equilibrium in which i gets the unit for that price. 
The conclusion  is that the introduction of discounting in itself does not destroy the 
qualitative results of Section 1. It is only that with discounting one has to be more careful 
in the specification  of  the  matching technology.  If one  wants to  model  a situation in 
which agents condition their behaviour on the identities of their potential partners, then 
the matching technology  should  already incorporate the features that agents recognize 
each other and have discretion over whom to meet.  A random matching technology  of 
the type  considered  throughout might provide  an acceptable  model  for a situation in 
which the trade is completely impersonal, but is obviously not a very sensible model for 
other situations in which identities matter and delays are costly. 
The above  observations  clarify the  difference in  conclusions  between  the present 
paper and the work of Binmore-Herrero and Gale.  The models analyzed in these papers 
resemble the present model,  but they combine  the random matching assumption with 
discounting  of  future gains  and  with  a  continuum  of  agents.  As  argued above,  the 
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that the seller's option of continuing with an ongoing bargaining process is more costly 
than turning to  another buyer and this  rules  out  the  noncompetitive  equilibria.  The 
continuum  of  agents assumption  strengthens this  effect still further, since  even  in the 
absence of discounting the combination of random matching and continuum rules out 
the possibility  of developing  any continuing seller-buyer relationships.  Thus, given the 
random matching assumption, both the discounting and continuum assumptions can be 
interpreted as  assumptions  about  the  anonymity  of  the  interaction.  The  continuum 
assumption  implies  complete  anonymity,  while  the  discounting  assumption  implies 
effective anonymity in the sense that alternative behaviour is more costly. 
6.  THE  CASE  OF  HETEROGENOUS  AGENTS 
This section extends the result of Proposition 1 to the case of nonidentical agents. Besides 
pointing  out that the  earlier result is not  peculiar to  the  case  of  identical  agents, the 
analysis here sharpens the cutting edge of that result.  With the heterogeneity of agents, 
it is possible to show that it is not only that the equilibrium need not be competitive, it 
also need not be efficient in the sense that the goods need not end up at the hands of the 
agents who value them the most. 
To expose  the main ideas,  it suffices to consider the simple cases of one seller vs. 
two non-identical  buyers and of two non-identical  sellers vs. two non-identical buyers. 
It will be evident from the discussion that, as before, the results extend immediately to 
arbitrary  numbers of buyers and sellers. As well, to avoid repetition on the considerations 
described in Section 2, we shall not provide detailed proofs of the following propositions, 
but rather outline the main arguments which are required for the extension. 
Consider a market with one seller and two buyers referred to as h and 1. The seller's 
reservation price is zero, while the buyers' reservation values are bh and b1,  respectively, 
where bh>  bl. Assume that all agents have full information as in Section 2. 
Proposition 5.  For all p*,  0p*  cbh  and for all i such that bi_p*,  there exists a 
subgame perfect equilibrium  in which the seller sells the good to bi, i = h, 1,  for the price p*. 
Proof  As in the proof  of  Proposition  1, the system starts in state RIGHT (i, p*). 
In this state, the seller demands p*  from buyer  i, demands  bj from buyer j  i4  rejects 
prices below p*, and agrees to price offers p* or above from buyer i; buyer i offers p* 
and agrees to price p* or less; buyer j $ i offers p = 0, and rejects any price above p*. 
If the seller deviates and demands from j  4  i, price p, bj  > p > p*, the system switches 
to RIGHT (j, p*). If j  i  i offers p > p*, the system switches to RIGHT (h, bh), i.e. to the 
equilibrium in which  bh gets the unit for price p =  bh.  1j 
Note that the equilibrium can support an inefficient allocation such that buyer 1 ends 
up with the unit, while buyer h, whose valuation is higher, remains without it. 
Observe that in such an equilibrium, buyer h cannot benefit from bidding above b,, 
since such a bid results in the equilibrium in which  h is expected to purchase the unit 
at the price bh that leaves him with no surplus. This feature of the equilibrium may seem 
somewhat unattractive, since  h participates in his own "punishment" by buying at the 
price bh, though he is indifferent between buying and not buying.  The following proposi- 
tion demonstrates that essentially the same outcomes can be sustained by equilibria that 
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Proposition 6.  Suppose that buyers never buy for  a price equal to their reservation 
value, then 
(i)  for all p*, O p* < bh, there is a SPE in which buyer h gets the unit  for p*. 
(ii)  for all p*, O  'p*  < bl, and all a < 1, there is a SPE in which buyer 1  gets the unit 
for price p*  with probability higher than a. 
Proof.  The equilibrium is based on states RIGHT (4  p, t).  When the system is in 
state RIGHT (i p, t) the interpretation is that buyer i has the privilege to buy the unit at 
price p  during the next  t periods.  If this privilege is unlimited in time, we shall write 
RIGHT (i, p)  instead of  RIGHT (i p, ac).  In states RIGHT (i, p, t) or RIGHT (i, p)  the 
seller's strategy is: 
Demand from buyer j  p ifj  = i and bh ifj  $ i. 
Accept from buyer j  q '  p if j = i and only bh if]  j  i. 
Buyer i's strategy is: 
Offer p and accept any q  p. 
Buyer j's,  j $ i, strategy is: 
Offer 0 and accept any q  min [p, bj]. 
To present the rules of transition between states, let  3  (t) denote the probability that 
the seller and buyer 1 will meet at least once in a stretch of  t periods. 
Transition Rules 
Switch from RIGHT (1,  p, t) to: 
RIGHT (h, p)  If 1 has just deviated or if t = 0. 
RIGHT (h, q)  if buyer h has just offered q >  p, where q is such that bh -q  < 
(bh-p)(1-P3(t))  and q >q. 
RIGHT (h, p)  if the seller demanded  q >  p from h. 
RIGHT (1,  p,  )  if the  seller has just  demanded  q > p  from  1, where  t>  t and 
satisfies b, -  q <,3(t)(b,  -p). 
RIGHT (1 p, t -  1)  if the seller has just met h. 
Switch from RIGHT (h, p)  to: 
RIGHT (h, b,)  if 1 has just offered q, b, > q >  p. 
RIGHT (1,  p, t)  if the seller has just demanded from 1 price q, b, > q >  p, where 
t is s.t. b,-q</3(t)(b,-p). 
Otherwise, the system remains in the same state. 
Now for part (i) of the proposition, let the system start at RIGHT (h, p*).  If p* 'bi, 
buyer 1 is practically out of the game and the result is obvious.  If p* < b,, the deviations 
that threaten the equilibrium are that buyer 1 would  offer p > p* or that the seller will 
demand from 1,  price p, p* < p < b,. Observe that, in the former case, the system switches 
to RIGHT (h, p)  so that the seller has no incentive to accept l's offer.  In the latter case, 
the system switches to RIGHT (1,  p*,  t),  where t is chosen to assure that l will reject the 
seller's demand because the expected utility after rejection, /3(t)(b, -p*),  is greater than 
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For part (ii) of the proposition, let the system start at state RIGHT (1,  p*, t), where 
t is such that 1 3(t)  > a.  Observe that if the strategies are followed,  then  1 gets the unit 
for p*  with  probability  83(t)> a.  To verify that this  is  a  SPE consider  the  following 
possible deviations in state RIGHT (1,  p*, t).  Buyer h will not benefit from offering p >  p*, 
since then the system switches to RIGHT (h, qc)  so that h gets bh -  q which is lower than 
h's expected utility, (bh -p*)(I  -,13(t)),  of following  the equilibrium (i.e. waiting in the 
hope that the seller and 1 will not meet in the next t periods).  The seller will not profit 
from offering to  h price p,  bh >  p >p*,  because  h will reject it and get the privilege to 
purchase the good for p*.  The seller cannot profit from demanding from 1 price p >  p*, 
since when 1 rejects it, the horizon t is adjusted so as to make the rejection beneficial for 
1. Finally, the seller has no incentive to reject l's offers of p*,  since when  l's privilege 
runs out the system will switch to RIGHT (h, p*)  and the seller will not get more than 
P*  11 
Next  consider a market with two sellers and two buyers: seller h, seller 1,  buyer h, 
and buyer 1, with reservation values  Sh = 3, SI = 0,  bh = 4, and b, = 1.  It follows  almost 
directly from Proposition 5 that this game has equilibria in which seller 1 sells to buyer 
1 at a price between 0 and 1 and seller h sells to buyer h at a price between 3 and 4.  To 
see this consider the subgame in which buyer h and seller h remain alone in the market, 
and fix the equilibrium price in this subgame to be p = 3, after any history.  Notice that, 
in the full game, this effectively changes the res-ervation  value of buyer h to 3,  Therefore, 
the game between seller 1  and the two buyers is essentially the one described in Proposition 
5 and hence has an equilibrium such that seller 1 sells to buyer 1 for a price between 0 
and 1. 
Observe that in this case an efficient trade will involve only the transfer of the unit 
from seller 1 to buyer h.  In this sense the equilibrium outlined above involves too much 
trade-more  than the competitive amount. 
7.  CONCLUSION 
Conditions  of  a frictionless  trading process  are not  sufficient to  yield  the  competitive 
solution as the unique equilibrium.  When the participants possess full information then 
there are plausible noncompetitive  equilibria. 
To single out the competitive solution as the unique equilibrium, one needs to limit 
the information that agents utilize in their market behaviour.  For example, when agents 
condition  their behaviour only  on state variables such as the sets of  active sellers and 
buyers and time, then the competitive solution is the unique equilibrium. 
APPENDIX 
Proposition 4, part (i).  Assume S = 1 and the random matching technology.  There is a unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium  agreement is reached immediately and the price is x(B)  or y(B)  according to 
whether the seller or the buyer was selected to propose. 
Proof.  Let us rewrite the appropriate version of system (1)-(2), 
y = 6(x+y)/2  (B.1) 
1-x  =  3(1-x  +  1-y)/2B.  (B.2) 
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As = {x I  x  is a perfect equilibrium payoff to a seller in a subgame 
starting with the seller's offer}. 
Ab =  {x I x  is a perfect equilibrium payoff to the seller in a 
subgame with a buyer's offer}. 
Let  mi = infAi,  Mi =  sup Ai,  i =  b, s.  The  method  of  the  proof  is  to  show  that both  (x, y) =  (Ms, Mb) and 
(x, y) =  (ms,  mb) are solutions for system (B.1)-(B.2).  Since this linear system has a unique solution, the above 
implies that ms = Ms and mb = Mb.  Hence, the sets As and Ab are singletons, so that the equilibrium is unique. 
Thus, the idea of the proof is similar to the method introduced by Shaked and Sutton (1984) for the equilibrium 
analysis of the two-person bargaining game. 
It turns out that routine arguments establish that (Ms, Mb) indeed solves system (B.1)-(B.2)  and that, 
mb = (ms +  mb).5/2.  (B.3) 
Lemma 1.  IfxEAsandyEAb,  then Z=6(x+y)/2EAb. 
Proof.  Consider the following  strategies in the subgame starting with a buyer's offer.  In the first period 
the buyer offers price Z and the seller agrees to Z and any price above it.  If the game reaches the next period, 
then all players follow  the equilibrium strategies that support seller's payoff x  or y, according to whether in 
the next period it is the seller or some buyer who is selected to propose. 
Now, since Z = 3(x+y)/2,  the seller will not profit from rejecting Z, but will not accept less than Z. The 
buyer  cannot  profit  from  offering  less  than  Z,  since  the  offer  will  be  rejected  and  he  will  get  at  most 
3(1 - x+  1  -y)/2  < 1-  Z.  Therefore, the strategies are at equilibrium.  The equilibrium payoff is Z  and hence 
ZEAb.  11 
Lemma 2.  Mb =  3(Ms + Mb)!2. 
Proof.  By Lemma 1, for all  xeAs  and yeAb,  Mb_3(x+y)/2  and hence  Mb,,?(Ms+Mb)/2.  It is 
impossible  to have Z EAb  which is strictly above  3(Ms+  Mb)!2.  This is because,  in the perfect equilibrium 
that supports Z, the buyer whose  offer starts the play of this equilibrium does  not get more than  1-  Z.  But 
since Z > 3(Ms + Mb)!2 and since the seller will agree to any price offer above Mb = 3(Ms + Mb)!2, the buyer 
can deviate profitably by offering a price between Z  and  3(Ms+Mb)/2. 
Lemma 3.  1-Ms  3(1-Ms+1-Mb)/2B. 
Proof  Almost  identical  arguments to  those  of  Lemma  1 establish that if  x e As,  y e Ab and  1-  Z= 
(1-x+1-y)/2B,  then ZeAs.  From this observation the lemma follows  immediately.  I 
Lemma 4.  In all perfect equilibria in a subgame that starts with the seller's offer to a certain buyer, this 
buyer's payoff is at least 1-  Ms.  In the perfect equilibria in a subgame that starts with a buyer's offer, the payoff 
to this buyer is at least 1  -  Mb. 
Proof  Consider a subgame that starts with the seller offering to buyer i.  Suppose that there exists  a 
perfect equilibrium in this subgame in which buyer i gets  1-  Ms -  E. This perfect equilibrium must be such 
that there is no immediate agreement, for otherwise the seller's payoff would be above Ms in contradiction to 
the definition of  Ms. 
Let p be a price between Ms and Ms + E,  and consider the following candidate for an equilibrium in this 
subgame.  The seller offers p and buyer i accepts it.  If the seller demands more than p or if buyer i rejects this 
offer, all  players continue  as in  the  original perfect equilibrium.  It is  easy to  verify that, given our initial 
hypothesis, this is indeed a perfect equilibrium and the seller's payoff is p > Ms, in contradiction to the definition 
of  Ms.  Thus, the initial hypothesis  is false and so in all perfect equilibria of this subgame buyer i's payoff is 
at least 1-  Ms. 
The second  statement of the lemma follows immediately from the definition of Mb. 
Lemma5.  1-Ms=3(1-Ms+1-Mb)/2B. 
Proof  Given  Lemma  3,  it  is  sufficient  to  show  that  there  is  no  Z E As  such  that  1 -  Z < 
3(1 -  Ms + 1-  Mb)/2B.  By Lemma 4, the R.H.S. of the inequality is the minimum payoff guaranteed to any 
buyer, if the game continues to the next period.  This is because,  with probability 1/B  a particular agent will 78  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
meet the seller in the next period and then, by Lemma 4, this buyer will get at least 1-  M, or 1-  Mb according 
to the selection  of the proposer.  Thus, in equilibrium, no buyer will offer or accept price p such that 1  -  p is 
smaller than the  R.H.S. of  the  inequality,  so  that there may not be  an equilibrium payoff Z  satisfying the 
inequality.  || 
Lemmas 1-5 prove that (M5, Mb) is a solution for system (B.1)-(B.2).  The validity of (B.3) can be proven 
by arguments in the same spirit as those  presented in Lemmas 1-4.  The difficulty is to prove that (M,,  Mb) 
satisfy equation (B.2) as well. 
Let z  denote  the  supremum of  a buyer's expected  utility in a subgame starting at the beginning  of  a 
period.  Consider the following  inequalities. 
-(1 - mj) c z c  B  (1 -mb)  +-  m?)  +  B  [1 -  (Mb + 1 -  Mb)] 
+  2B  [1-(Im+I-M5)].  (B.4) 
2BJ 
To verify the first inequality in (B.4) note that the buyer will accept any offer above 8z and therefore m '_ 1-  5z. 
Next  observe that the R.H.S. of  (B.4) gives an upper bound  on  z.  The term 2(1 -  Mb) +2(1  - m)  bounds the 
buyer's expected  utility in  the  event  that he  meets  the  seller  in the  next  period  and  it is  weighted  by the 
probability, 1/ B, of that event.  The term 1 -  (mb + 1 -  Mb) bounds the expected utility of the considered buyer, 
say i, in the event that in the next period the seller will meet another buyer j $ i and that buyer will be selected 
to propose.  In this event the seller's expected payoff will be, by definition, at least  Mb  and buyer j's  expected 
payoff will be at least 1-  Mb  (because  of Lemma 4).  Therefore, in this event, the payoff to buyer i is at most 
[1-(Mb+1-Mb)]  and  this  is  weighted  by  the  probability  of  the  event,  (B-1)/2B.  Similarly, the  term 
1 -  (m5  + 1 -  Mj) bounds buyer i's utility in the event that in the next period the seller will meet another buyer 
j $ i and the seller will be selected to propose.  Then, by definition, the seller's payoff will be at least mi  and 
by Lemma 4 buyerj's payoff is at least 1 -  M,  Therefore, in this event buyer i's payoff is at most 1 -  (m5 + 1 -  M5) 
and this is weighted by the probability (B -  1)/2B  of this event. 
Using the fact that (M5, Mb) is a solution for (B.1)-(B.2)  we get 
M  (B - 8)(2  -  8)  M  6(B - 8)  (B.5) 
B(2-3)-8  '(-)B 
Substituting these into (B.3) and (B.4) and solving for mn we get 
(B-8)(2-8) 
= M.  ms  B (2 -3  )-,3  M 
Thusm  S=M5=  x(B)  and  Mb=Mb=  y(B)  and  obviously  from  (B.5)  lim,  lx(B)=lim8,,  y(B).  II 
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